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I. INTRODUCTION
In this Article I consider whether the existing international legal
human rights regime enjoys political authority over sovereign states.1  In
particular, I explore whether, just as states can cite their role as the 
* © 2013 Christopher Heath Wellman.  Chair & Professor, The Department of
Philosophy, Washington University in St. Louis.  I am indebted to Thomas Pogge, Carl 
Wellman, and Daniel Weltman for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this
Article.  I am also immensely grateful to Allen Buchanan.  Not only did his excellent
book, ALLEN BUCHANAN, THE HEART OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2013), initially lead me to
pursue the topic but I first received extremely helpful comments from Allen at a 
conference on human rights in honor of James Nickel at Duke University in March 2013
and then later in response to an earlier version of this Article. 
1. There is room to disagree about precisely which institutions should be counted
within the international legal human rights regime.  I take no stand here on whether the 
several regional human rights regimes count, for instance, but I presume that this regime 
includes at least the General Assembly, the Human Rights Council, the Human Rights
Committee, the Security Council, the Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the Tribunal for 


















   
  
  
      
        
 
 
    
  
primary institutions that protect human rights in order to justify their
claim to authority over their citizens, perhaps the current human rights 
regime might plausibly cite its secondary role in securing human rights 
in order to ground its authority over these states.
II. CLARIFYING THE QUESTION 
To motivate my central question, let me begin by noting why it is such
an exhilarating time to be a student of political philosophy.  At its essence, 
political philosophy is about human nature, the problems to which this 
nature gives rise, and the institutional structures we should construct to 
address these problems.  Although there have always been anarchists
who allege either that human nature creates no problems or that any
difficulties can be satisfactorily addressed in the absence of a state, the
vast majority of political theorists have been statists.2  And because virtually 
everyone presumes that we need states, political philosophers—who 
have disagreed about human nature and the problems to which it leads— 
have predominantly debated how the state should be organized.3 More 
recently, however, theorists have been alive to the possibility that 
various problems—even indisputably political problems—might be 
better solved by something other than sovereign states.  Among other 
options, scholars increasingly suggest that various concerns call for 
regional or global institutions or nongovernmental organizations.4 In 
other words, both because some problems—such as climate change— 
appear to be inherently global and because some domestic governments 
seem unable or unwilling to perform various functions that a well-run
state should, much of the most interesting theorizing in contemporary
political philosophy concerns the types of institutions we should design 
to supplement existing states.5 
Against this backdrop, consider our desire to reduce human rights 
violations. There is a massive and ever-expanding body of literature on 
2. See, e.g., Francisco O. Ramirez, Statism, Equality, and Housewifery, 24 PAC.
SOC. REV. 175, 176 (1981). 
3. See, e.g., Theodore J. Biagini, Machiavelli and His Influence on Modern 
International Law: Victory Goes to the Swift, the Strong, and Sometimes, the Ruthless, 
37 LINCOLN L. REV. 1, 3–8 (2009–2010) (describing how Machiavelli’s beliefs about 
human nature influenced his beliefs about states); Jeremy Waldron, Kant’s Legal 
Positivism, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1535, 1536 (1996) (discussing Kant’s beliefs about the state). 
4. See, e.g., Christopher C. Joyner, Redressing Impunity for Human Rights 
Violations: The Universal Declaration and the Search for Accountability, 26 DENV. J. 
INT’L L. & POL’Y 591, 591–92 (1998). 



















      
   
    
   
    
      
  
 
   
[VOL. 50:  931, 2013] Human Rights Regime 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
how we should conceive of human rights.6  Rather than wade into that
debate here, let me merely stipulate that, whatever else may or may not 
be involved in the human rights movement, at least one central concern 
of human rights activists has been to design institutions that maximally
ensure everyone is protected against the standard threats to living 
minimally decent human lives.7  Because states are thought to provide
the first line of defense against these standard threats, it is commonly
taken for granted that our primary objective should be to construct
territorially delineated governments that are principally responsible for 
protecting the human rights of their constituents. As our experience with
rogue and failed states makes painfully clear, however, a state that is 
both able and willing to adequately protect all of its inhabitants against
the standard threats to living minimally decent lives is more the exception 
than the rule.8  Given this, the need for a second line of defense is 
obvious, implicating the desirability of an international human rights 
regime that can play a supporting role in the global fight to secure 
everyone’s human rights. 
But notice: just as our experience with rogue and failed states
demonstrates that our pressing need for domestic governments should 
not lead us to regard all existing states as having authority over their 
citizens, our desire for an effective international legal human rights 
regime should not lead us to automatically approve the existing regime. 
Thus, even if we grant everything I have said about the desirability of
constructing an international legal institution that plays a remedial role 
in the important struggle to secure everyone’s basic needs, it does not
follow that the existing international regime enjoys political authority.  It
6. See, e.g., Rachel J. Anderson, Reimagining Human Rights Law: Toward
Global Regulation of Transnational Corporations, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 183 (2010)
(arguing that human rights law should be modified to include laws that regulate modern 
transnational corporations); Curtis F. Doebbler, Overlegalizing Human Rights, 96 AM. 
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 381 (2002) (arguing against the perception of human rights as 
“wishful thinking”). 
7. See, e.g., Jennifer A. Downs, A Healthy and Ecologically Balanced Environment:
An Argument for a Third Generation Right, 3 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 351, 362 (1993);
Rajeev Kadambi, The Idea of Human Rights, 24 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 949, 953 (2010) 
(book review).
8. For a list and ranking of “failed states,” see The Failed States Index Rankings, 
FUND FOR PEACE, http://ffp.statesindex.org/rankings (last visited Mar. 15, 2014). For a 
description of a “rogue state,” see Anthony Clark Arend, International Law and Rogue 




























     
  
 
    
     
   
is an open empirical question whether this regime is in fact satisfactorily
performing the functions that would justify such a claim to dominion.
With this in mind, it is worth evaluating the current regime to see how 
satisfied we should be with its actual performance.  If the international 
legal human rights regime is doing an adequate job remedying the
shortcomings of existing states, then this obviously bolsters its claim to 
authority.  But if the current regime is not satisfactorily performing the 
requisite functions, then no matter how enthusiastic we are about the
abstract idea of such a system, we should think long and hard about 
what, if any, authority the existing regime enjoys.
Finally, because there is room for different authors to mean various
things by political authority, let me specify that I am particularly 
interested to know whether and to what extent states and other actors on 
the global stage are morally obligated to defer to this regime.  The 
crucial issue is whether even legitimate states have morally weighty
reasons to comply with and otherwise support this regime even in cases 
where they have not voluntarily agreed to do so.  For instance, does the
International Criminal Court (ICC) have the authority to issue morally
binding commands to countries such as the United States, even though
they are not state parties to the Rome Statute?9  Even though the existing 
regime is a largely voluntary operation that forcibly interferes almost
exclusively in illegitimate states,10 I focus on this question because this
regime’s political authority becomes a vexing question primarily when it 
either interferes in the domestic affairs of a legitimate state or demands 
the support of a party that has never agreed to help out.  I say this both
because, in my view, at least, illegitimate states lack the right to political
self-determination that would ground the corresponding obligation of
external parties to refrain from interfering in these illegitimate states’
internal matters and because I presume that there is nothing morally
problematic about demanding that a state honor its morally valid
9. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute] (lacking ratification by the United States).
Because of doubts as to whether there is such a thing as an international legal human 
rights regime, Daniel Weltman has suggested to me that it would be preferable to replace 
my more general question about the authority of this regime with a series of more
specific questions about whether states must defer to the ICC, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, et cetera. 
10. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith, International Human Rights Law and the United 
States Double Standard, 1 GREEN BAG 2D 365, 372 (1998) (“International human rights
law is primarily designed for nations with domestic institutions that do not hold the 
promise for generating adequate human rights protections.”); Amy C. Harfeld, Oh Righteous
Delinquent One: The United States’ International Human Rights Double Standard—
Explanation, Example, and Avenues for Change, 4 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 59, 96 (2001) 
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commitments.11  Thus, examining the political authority of the existing 
international legal human rights regime amounts to asking whether 
it has the moral standing to demand compliance and support from
paradigmatically legitimate states such as Norway, New Zealand, and
Canada.12 
III. IS THE CURRENT HUMAN RIGHTS REGIME ANALOGOUS TO 
ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY? 
For those of us who are both discouraged by the epic failings of
existing states and excited about the prospect of providing a second line
of defense for the masses of people currently vulnerable to the standard
threats to living minimally decent lives, it is tempting to presume that 
the existing international legal human rights regime must surely enjoy
political authority.  I want to caution against this temptation.  I think that 
we should take seriously the notion that the existing regime enjoys no
more authority than a failed or rogue state. To motivate this line of
thought, I propose that the existing international legal human rights 
regime can be usefully compared to Athenian democracy.
Viewed within its historical context, Athenian democracy was 
unquestionably a remarkable achievement.13  Compared with the
contemporary tyrannies and oligarchies, Athens was certainly relatively
democratic,14 but with the benefit of hindsight, we can now see that it 
was not really democratic and it did not enjoy political authority.  It gave 
only a relatively small minority of constituents a voice and a vote, and it 
therefore lacked the moral standing to create laws that morally bound the 
slaves and other unenfranchised constituents it forcibly excluded from 
11. For a defense of my claim that illegitimate states lack a right to political self-
determination, see ANDREW ALTMAN & CHRISTOPHER HEATH WELLMAN, A LIBERAL
THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE (2009).
12. See Legatum Prosperity Index, LEGATUM INST., http://www.prosperity.com/#!/ 
(last visited Mar. 15, 2014) (ranking Norway, New Zealand, and Canada in the top five 
prosperous countries based on factors such as wealth, economic growth, and quality of 
life).
13. See, e.g., Keith Werhan, The Classical Athenian Ancestry of American Freedom of 
Speech, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 293, 293 (2008) (“The Athenians invented democracy . . . a 
revolutionary system in which the people of a community . . . held a monopoly on
political power . . . governing themselves and their community as they thought best.”). 






















    
 
  
   




the political process.15  Thus, even though so-called Athenian democracy
deserves applause for the remarkable manner by which it gave voice and
vote to some of its citizens, we must regard Athens as lacking in authority
because it should be evaluated upon how it treated everyone within its
dominion, not just the privileged, enfranchised few. 
Does the current international legal human rights regime warrant an 
analogous assessment? It is worth asking this question because although 
there is much at which to marvel in its rhetoric, this regime does a terribly 
uneven job ensuring that humans are not vulnerable to the standard
threats against living minimally decent lives.  And most importantly, it 
appears to provide the least amount of protection for those who need it
most.  To put it in far too blunt and oversimplified geographic terms, the 
current regime seems to do an admirable job protecting Western Europeans— 
among select others—but it fails miserably in protecting sub-Saharan
Africans—among many others.16  Thus, just as the Athenian government 
must be assessed based upon how it treated all of its constituents rather
than merely the select few it enfranchised, a human rights regime should
be appraised on its global record.  It is clearly not enough that the existing
regime does an exemplary job protecting Europeans when so many others
avoidably remain horribly vulnerable to the standard threats to living 
minimally decent lives.
Many will be aghast at my accusation that the existing human rights 
regime does little more than protect Europeans against the standard 
European threats to living minimally decent European lives, so let me
offer at least a quick defense of my stark claim.  First of all, imagine that 
an intelligent alien came to earth on an anthropological mission.  If we
explained to this alien that we had constructed an elaborate human rights 
institution to protect, among other things, vulnerable people from standard
threats to living minimally decent lives, the alien would undoubtedly be 
astonished to learn that none of the core human rights documents even
mentions anything about reliable access to potable water. Of course,
15. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Bollen & Pamela M. Paxton, Democracy Before Athens, 
in INEQUALITY, DEMOCRACY, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 13, 17 (Manus I. Midlarsky
ed., 1997) (“[T]he Athenian ‘democracy’ was a democracy only for adult male citizens. 
Women, metics, children, and slaves were not included.”). 
16. See, e.g., Jennifer Myers, Human Rights and Development: Using Advanced
Technology To Promote Human Rights in Sub-Saharan Africa, 30 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L 
L. 343, 344 (1998) (noting that “[w]hile the majority of the Western world realizes and
embraces the benefits of advanced technology, sub-Saharan Africa is still working to
provide for the most basic needs, such as adequate health care, food, and sanitation”); 
Sub-Saharan Africa, UNITED NATIONS POPULATION FUND, http://www.unfpa.org/worldwide/
africa.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2014) (noting that sub-Saharan Africa “faces serious 
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those who seek to defend the current documents against the charge of
Eurocentrism could quickly explain that, properly understood, several of 
the articles in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights should be 
conceived of as implicitly providing protection against a lack of
drinkable water.17 In addition, one might note that on July 28, 2010, the 
United Nations General Assembly approved Resolution 64/292, which
explicitly “[r]ecognizes the right to safe and clean drinking water and
sanitation as a human right that is essential for the full enjoyment of life
and all human rights.”18  Against these responses, however, one might
reasonably counter that if potable water had ever been as scarce in Europe 
as it is in Africa, then you can be quite sure that one of the first articles in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights would explicitly enunciate 
each person’s right to secure access to an adequate supply of water—and 
by now, numerous political philosophers would have gotten tenure by 
writing articles and books on this “basic” human right. 
Although there may be other ways in which the language of the core 
human rights documents would be different if the current regime were
not so Eurocentric,19 the biggest problems with the status quo stem more 
from its execution than its rhetoric. Consider the Genocide Convention,
for instance. Whatever quibbles one may have about this convention, it 
appears to have been written in a relatively geographic-neutral manner.20 
Despite this formal neutrality, its principles have emphatically not been
applied uniformly.21  The most spectacular example of this, of course, 
was the international community’s lack of response to the recent horrors
in Rwanda.22  I appreciate that it can be extremely difficult for international
17. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, arts.
22, 25, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
18. G.A. Res. 64/292, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/292 (July 28, 2010). 
19. For instance, would the core human rights documents explicitly feature a 
human right against “preventable infectious diseases” if illnesses such as HIV/AIDS and 
malaria ravaged Europeans rather than Africans? 
20. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 278.
21. See, e.g., Beth Van Schaack, Note, The Crime of Political Genocide: Repairing 
the Genocide Convention’s Blind Spot, 106 YALE L.J. 2259, 2261 (1997) (arguing that the 
Genocide Convention inadequately covered Cambodian genocide). 
22. In 1994, the Rwandan Hutus killed 800,000 Rwandan Tutsis and brutally raped
many Tutsi women.  See Genocide in Rwanda, UNITED HUM. RTS. COUNCIL, http://www.
unitedhumanrights.org/genocide/genocide_in_rwanda.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2014); 
Rwanda: How the Genocide Happened, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/africa/
1288230.stm (last updated Dec. 18, 2008, 9:53 AM).  Many criticize the international
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bodies to know in real time whether and how best to intervene in domestic
crises around the world, but it is simply unthinkable that the Security
Council would have reacted in anything like the fashion it did in Rwanda 
if this blood had been spilled in Europe, rather than Africa.
Critics have voiced a similar complaint against the ICC.23  The ICC is
precisely the type of supranational institution I had in mind earlier when
I mentioned the promising trend of thinking beyond the state. This 
emerging organization has an unprecedented capability to eliminate the 
global culture of impunity that has traditionally left masses of folks 
vulnerable to abuse at the hands of unaccountable tyrants.24  The most 
common objection to the ICC, though, is its practice of selective
prosecution. In addition to a general concern that charges are being
brought against only a tiny proportion of those who violate human rights, 
critics worry more specifically that defendants will come exclusively
from poor, geopolitically insignificant countries.25  No matter how many 
human rights are violated in Chechnya or what atrocities occur in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, or Guantanamo Bay, for instance, there is no way that the 
court would ever pursue Putin, Bush, or Obama.  If the ICC did try to
prosecute a military or political leader from a powerful country, it would 
risk losing the precious geopolitical support it has only recently been
able to muster.26  As a consequence, many predict that virtually all of the
future defendants will come from Africa.27  Thus, despite the impartial
rhetoric of the ICC, we do not in practice have a genuinely global court 
that pursues the very worst rights violators in the world; more realistically,
community’s failure to quickly or effectively respond to the violence. See, e.g., Genocide in
Rwanda, supra; Ghosts of Rwanda: Introduction, PBS (Apr. 1, 2004), http://www.pbs.org/
wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/etc/synopsis.html. 
23. See, e.g., Mark D. Kielsgard, War on the International Criminal Court, 8 N.Y. 
CITY L. REV. 1, 9 (2005) (arguing that without additional United States support, the ICC 
lacks enforcement capabilities and legitimacy).
24. See Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 1 (granting the ICC “the power to exercise its
jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern”).
25. See, e.g., Allison Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability 
of Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 510, 
510–11 (2003) (noting that the ICC is open to the criticism that it is a political institution
dominated by politics); Lana Ljuboja, Comment, Justice in an Uncooperative World:
ICTY and ICTR Foreshadow ICC Ineffectiveness, 32 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 767, 784–85 (2010) 
(noting that the ICC is hesitant to prosecute more powerful signatories because doing so
would undermine the ICC’s operations). 
26. See, e.g., Ljuboja, supra note 25, at 784–85. 
27. See, e.g., id. at 785; David Bosco, Why Is the International Criminal Court 
Picking Only on Africa?, WASH. POST (Mar. 29, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/ 
2013-03-29/opinions/38117212_1_international-criminal-court-african-union-central-afri 
can-republic; ICC, A Tool To Recolonise Africa, AFR. BUS., http://www.africanbusinessmag 
azine.com/special-reports/sector-reports/icc-vs-africa/icc-a-tool-to-recolonise-africa (last
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we have constructed a regional mechanism largely funded by Europeans28 
that will largely prosecute and punish Africans.  And interestingly, when
I pressed Fatou Bensouda, Chief Prosecutor of the ICC, on this issue, she 
did not deny this emerging phenomenon.29  Instead, she countered that
the most egregious human rights violations were occurring in Africa, 
and so if the ICC did not pursue the African leaders responsible for these 
crimes, it would be turning its back on masses of African victims.
Personally, I have no qualms with this response, but for our present
purposes, I wish simply to note that citing Africa’s near-monopoly on
the worst human rights atrocities merely confirms the analogy between
Athenian democracy and the existing international legal human rights
regime.
Along these same lines, consider the so-called resource curse—the 
observation that countries regularly seem to do dramatically worse if they
are rich in natural resources.30  At first blush, this principle is extremely 
counterintuitive because one would expect that ample reserves of oil, 
gold, diamonds, and such would enrich a country, thereby enabling its 
government to take good care of its citizens. Far too often, however, 
what actually happens is that the political leaders who have de facto
control over these deposits enrich themselves by selling access to these 
resources to wealthy foreign states and companies.31  As a general rule,
then, citizens should hope that no mineral deposits or other valuable 
natural commodities exist within their country’s national boundaries 
because one’s government is much more likely to attend to the needs and
wishes of its own citizens if the international business community takes
no interest in the state.  When wealthy corporations covet reliable access
to a country’s natural resources, however, such companies will have the 
28. See, e.g., The International Criminal Court and the Fight Against Impunity, 
EUR. COMMISSION EXTERNAL REL., http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/human_rights/icc/
index_en.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2014) (noting that the European Union has given strong
financial support to the ICC). 
29. I asked Bensouda, who was then Deputy Prosecutor, this question after her
speech, Fatou Bensouda, Looking Back, Looking Ahead—Reflections from the Office of 
the Prosecutor of the ICC (Sept. 22, 2011), in 11 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 437 
(2012).
30. On the resource curse, see generally Leif Wenar, Property Rights and the Resource
Curse, 36 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 2 (2008). 
31. See, e.g., Carter Stewart, The FCPA Is Just as Relevant and Necessary Today 
as Thirty-Five Years Ago, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1039, 1042 (2012) (noting that corruption 
often results in countries’ leaders enriching themselves by depleting and selling their 






    
 
 
    
 
 










    
    
      
 
 
   
 
 
money either to coopt the existing rulers or replace them with successors 
who will be more accommodating.  It is important to stress, however,
that this dynamic would seem to apply principally to countries that lack
entrenched liberal democratic traditions.32  If massive oil reserves were 
discovered in Germany tomorrow, for instance, few would lose sleep
worrying that Germany had just been “cursed” because although we should
always be alert to the potential for corruption when the financial stakes
are great, Germany’s wealth and political stability protect its citizens 
from being outbid by external financial interests.  In Africa, however, the
legacy of European colonization33—among other things—has left many 
countries relatively poor and so politically fragile that we would be right 
to worry that a typical country might be cursed by a similar discovery of 
resources.
More depressing examples come from the actual practice of emerging 
global markets because although it is easy to be excited about the promise
of organizations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary 
Fund, and the World Trade Organization (WTO), these institutions have 
had at best spotty records.34 Let me begin with an admittedly stylized
example of how things can unwittingly go off of the rails and then follow 
up with a more general explanation as to why we should be skeptical that
things will soon improve for the global poor. First, suppose that a poor 
African country appeals to the World Bank for funds to feed its
subsistence-farming citizens who are starving to death in the midst of a 
prolonged drought.  With the idea that it is better to teach a person to 
fish than merely give a person a fish, the bank offers to help this country
on the condition that it make basic structural reforms designed to
insulate it from similar disasters in the future.  In particular, imagine the
bank insists that this country transition from subsistence farming to cotton 
32. See, e.g., Reagan R. Demas, Moment of Truth: Development in Sub-Saharan
Africa and Critical Alterations Needed in Application of the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act and Other Anti-Corruption Initiatives, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 315, 325–29 (2011)
(noting that the resource curse hinders sub-Saharan Africa). 
33. For a discussion of European colonization of Africa, see John Mukum Mbaku,
Providing a Foundation for Wealth Creation and Development in Africa: The Role of the
Rule of Law, 38 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 959, 967–76 (2013). 
34. See, e.g., Sarah Boseley, World Bank Poverty Drive a Failure, Says Report, 
GUARDIAN (July 2, 2003, 9:24 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/jul/03/
sarahboseley (describing the World Bank’s failure to cut malnutrition in developing 
countries); Jonathan Masters, The International Monetary Fund, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 
REL., http://www.cfr.org/europe/international-monetary-fund/p25303 (last updated Oct.
9, 2013) (noting that the International Monetary Fund has been criticized on multiple
grounds); Aurelie Walker, The WTO Has Failed Developing Nations, POVERTY MATTERS 
BLOG (Nov. 14, 2011, 10:49 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/pov 
erty-matters/2011/nov/14/wto-fails-developing-countries (listing various ways the WTO 
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farming, which—given the ideal climate and prevalence of inexpensive
labor—could produce vast quantities of cotton that could then be sold
for money on the international market.  The money in turn could be used
to buy the various commodities necessary to sustain the domestic population. 
Because the drought-stricken country is in such desperate need and because
the required reforms seem to make sense, it agrees to the World Bank’s 
conditions, forces the subsistence farmers off of their land, and sets up
large cotton farms that produce enormous amounts of cotton for sale on
the international market.  So far, so good.  Problems emerge, however, when 
wealthy cotton farmers in the United States are, predictably, not happy
about being undersold by their newfound African competition. The United
States cotton farmers will use their wealth and domestic political capital
to get massive subsidies from the United States government. With these
subsidies, the United States farmers will dump their cotton on the 
international market at artificially reduced prices so that the imperiled
citizens of the poor African country are now left with huge amounts of
relatively useless cotton, without the food previously grown by the 
subsistence farmers, and with a debt to the World Bank it cannot repay.
Unfortunately, this stylized example is indicative of what tends to happen 
in a global marketplace where the various actors have such dramatically 
divergent levels of bargaining power.  Although I remain enthusiastic about 
both capitalism and globalization as general, abstract ideas, we should 
not be surprised that negotiations between extremely wealthy and terribly 
poor parties will continue to exacerbate the divide between the haves and 
the have-nots. As Thomas Pogge has emphasized, this is precisely what
has happened in recent negotiations within the WTO.35  In particular, 
Pogge has called attention to features of the Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement, which prohibits the 
production and sale of generic versions of basic medicines for use in
developing countries.36  As a consequence of this new arrangement, a
great deal of avoidable mortality and morbidity in developing countries,
which had previously been prevented, is now going untreated merely
because the world’s poorest countries have no effective choice but to
agree to whatever terms the wealthy countries dictate.37  So, although it
may or may not be the case that inclusion in the WTO will pay dividends 
35. See THOMAS POGGE, WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 21–23 (2d ed. 2008). 
36. See id. 















    
  
 





   
    
in the long run for even the poorest countries, masses of the world’s 
most imperiled people have recently been made dramatically worse off.38 
They have avoidably become more vulnerable to one of the most devastating 
threats to living minimally decent lives because powerful corporations in 
the wealthiest countries have had the clout to dramatically raise the price 
of admission into the WTO for poor countries and their constituents.39 
This very quick characterization—some would say “caricature”—of 
the current geopolitical landscape raises more questions than it answers,
but it at least suggests the plausibility of the following assessment of the 
status quo: Even if we assume for the sake of argument that the existing 
international legal human rights regime performs superbly as a second 
line of defense for the constituents of well-oiled liberal democratic societies,
it appears to do a very poor job helping those who inhabit inept or tyrannous 
states. If one begins, as I do, by insisting that such an institution would 
have political authority only if it adequately performed some vitally
important function, this spells trouble for the existing regime because the 
most important job we want a human rights regime to perform is to
make the world’s most imperiled individuals less vulnerable.  Once one
recognizes that this is the particular task on which we should focus, it is 
hard not to be pessimistic.  Indeed, given both that the divide between
the global rich and the global poor is widening at an alarming rate40 and 
that increased international interaction provides unprecedented opportunity
for the rich to exploit their relative bargaining power over the poor, the 
world’s most imperiled citizens may actually be worse off than their 
counterparts were fifty years ago. 
We can recapitulate our argument to this point in four deliberately
provocative—and geographically oversimplified—steps.  First, the best
prospect for establishing the political authority of an institution is to 
demonstrate that its constituents’ compliance is necessary and sufficient
for it to perform some vitally important task.  Second, the principal 
function we seek from a human rights regime is to provide a second line 
of defense for those vulnerable individuals whose states do a poor job of
providing a first line of defense against the standard threats to living
minimally decent lives.  Third, if today’s Africans are more vulnerable
than their counterparts fifty years ago, then no matter what wonderful 
38. See id. 
39. See, e.g., White Man’s Shame, ECONOMIST, Sept. 25, 1999, at 89, 89 (noting 
that antidumping duties and high tariffs on developing countries prevent them from 
engaging in trade). 
40. See, e.g., Branko Milanovic, More or Less, FIN. & DEV., Sept. 2011, at 6, 7; Emma 
Seery, Widening Gap Between Rich and Poor Threatens To Swallow Us All, GUARDIAN 
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benefits are being supplied to Europeans, the existing human rights
regime is clearly failing in its most important task.  Fourth and finally, 
we therefore must conclude that the existing international legal human
rights regime lacks political authority.  At this point, then, the analogy 
with Athenian democracy appears apt. 
IV. IN DEFENSE OF THE REGIME 
What might we say in response to this indictment of the existing 
regime?  The most obvious answer is that my characterization of the 
status quo is not just “quick” and “provocative” but that it is misleading, if
not outright false.  It is misleading to characterize the world’s haves and
have-nots solely in terms of Europe and Africa when there are masses of
relatively poor and imperiled people all over the globe and many of 
them, in Asia and South America, for instance, have made considerably 
more progress in the last few decades than the worst off in Africa.41 
Second, even if some of the problems in Africa continue to be especially
poignant and intractable, it is simply false to say that Africans are no 
better off now than they were fifty years ago.  It may be true that the 
economic inequality between Europe and Africa has become far more 
pronounced and pernicious, but this allows us to draw conclusions about 
only the relative, not the absolute standing of Africans then and now. 
The truth is that although our current scheme for globalizing capitalism 
has disproportionately benefitted Europeans, it has also been a net 
benefit for Africans.42  What is more, as the dividends from research and 
41. See, e.g., Sou Chiam, Asia’s Experience in the Quest for a Regional Human 
Rights Mechanism, 40 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 127, 137 (2009) (noting that
several subregional intergovernmental organizations in Asia have made progress in 
attempting to protect human rights); Ellen Lutz & Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice
Cascade: The Evolution and Impact of Foreign Human Rights Trials in Latin America, 2 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 4 (2001) (“In Latin America during the last two decades of the 20th
century there was a rapid shift toward recognizing the legitimacy of human rights norms 
and an increase in international and regional action to effect compliance with those
norms.”); Roda Mushkat, Globalization and the International Environmental Legal
Response: The Asian Context, 4 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 49, 59 (2003) (“[Asian countries]
ha[ve] been able to undergo industrialization at a pace unseen elsewhere and in many
instances ha[ve] attained living standards comparable with those prevailing in leading
developed countries.”).
42. See, e.g., A Hopeful Continent, ECONOMIST, Mar. 2, 2013, at 3, 3 (reporting that 































    
development into technology—especially medical innovations—have 
trickled down to the world’s poor, the link between poverty and ill 
health has lessened.43  Thus, even if for the sake of argument we grant 
that Africans are worse in relative terms than they were fifty years ago,
which is highly contestable itself, in absolute terms, they are both less 
poor and less imperiled by their poverty than they were prior to the 
emergence of the international legal human rights regime. 
Against this rejoinder, I would emphasize two points. First of all, even if
there is less suffering than several decades ago, it seems incontrovertible
that there is much more than there should be, and ultimately—in my
view—we must evaluate a human rights regime in terms of the extent to 
which it eliminates the worst forms of avoidable human suffering.44 
Second, the economic and health gains are not necessarily the work of
the human rights regime; in large measure, they are the consequence of
the gradual process of economic integration that has been designed
largely by and for wealthy countries.  Much more than initiatives such as 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Genocide Convention,
or the ICC, economic globalization has produced the meager benefits in 
Africa.
It would be extremely difficult to pinpoint precisely what benefits 
flow directly from which interventions, but we need not get bogged down in
that debate here because the previous point suggests a much more basic
and important counterpoint: Namely, the charge that the current human
rights regime cannot take credit for all of the recent gains enjoyed by the 
world’s worst off highlights the obvious fact that the current regime
should not be held responsible for all that is wrong with the status quo. 
Given that the human rights regime is merely one—relatively impotent— 
actor on the world stage, it seems patently unfair to complain that it has
not solved all of the problems that lamentably continue to plague the
world’s poor.  The crucial thing to remember is that as much as we might 
like to have a human rights regime that is strong enough to effectively
43. See, e.g., Global Pub. Health Achievements Team, Ten Great Public Health 
Achievements—Worldwide, 2001–2010, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION 
(June 24, 2011), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6024a4.htm (“During
the previous century, great progress was made in raising life expectancy and reducing 
mortality among infants and young children through improvements in living conditions 
and activities to combat major infectious causes of death.”).
44. Students of World Poverty and Human Rights will likely recognize Thomas 
Pogge’s influence here. See POGGE, supra note 35, at 25–26.  My thinking has obviously
been shaped by Pogge’s pathbreaking work in this area, but nothing in this Article
depends upon Pogge’s controversial thesis that the global poor are wrongly harmed when
an institutional system that foreseeably and avoidably includes human rights deficits is 
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help failed states and police rogue states, the existing regime simply
does not have this sort of power.  And this is for understandable reasons. 
After all, given that the international legal human rights regime was 
forged in the midst of states that would never have permitted the
emergence of an institution strong enough to effectively restrict the 
activities of sovereign states,45 it would have been self-defeating to set 
out to construct such a powerful organization.  Thus, it is no accident 
that the existing regime principally operates by setting clear human
rights standards that each individual country is then exhorted to meet.
This more modest objective was rightly adopted as the most effective
strategy for a world populated by states that jealously protect their
sovereignty.46  The analogy between the existing human rights regime
and Athenian democracy is ultimately revealed to be inapt, then, because 
even if the inequalities between the institutionally secure and the
institutionally vulnerable denizens of today’s world are reminiscent of the 
division between the politically empowered and the unenfranchised
in ancient Greece, the existing human rights regime cannot be held
accountable in the same way as the Athenian government.  In Athens, the 
government was the principal—if not the sole—coercive actor that
enforced these dramatically unequal roles,47 whereas the human rights
regime is merely one relatively insignificant component of the existing
geopolitical infrastructure. 
In light of this, there is room to roundly condemn the government in
Athens and yet view the existing human rights regime as part of the 
solution, rather than part of the problem.  Indeed, a defender of the current 
regime might flip the entire critique on its head and suggest that the 
inexcusable realities of the status quo merely demonstrate that we should 
substantially increase the relative power and standing of the human rights
regime. To put it bluntly—and optimistically—the idea here is that if only
the international legal human rights regime were suitably fortified, it would
have the power to ensure that avoidable genocides such as Rwanda’s no 
longer occur; that prosecutors within the ICC are empowered to pursue 
the worst violators of human rights everywhere; that no country has to 
45. See, e.g., Danner, supra note 25, at 516 (noting that the ICC lacks unfettered 
prosecutorial discretion because “[t]he ability to accuse political and military leaders of
serious crimes—and perhaps to try and convict them—is not the kind of power one 
wants to deliver without any restraints”). 
46. I am grateful to Allen Buchanan for impressing this point on me. 

























    
 
worry about being cursed by its abundant supply of natural resources;
and that organizations such as the WTO refrain from imposing TRIPS-
like agreements upon vulnerable populations.  In the end, then, perhaps 
our biggest dissatisfaction with the existing human rights regime is its 
modesty; rather than restrain itself to merely those roles where it can
garner a political consensus, it should more boldly demand support and 
more freely insert itself into any arena in which vulnerable people can be
effectively protected. 
I have a great deal of sympathy for this response, but notice how 
dramatically it changes the human rights regime’s claim to authority.
Rather than allege that this regime is entitled to global compliance because 
of what it has accomplished or is currently accomplishing and rather
than claim that the regime will be entitled to support once it begins 
accomplishing certain vital tasks, the argument now becomes that the
existing regime currently enjoys political authority because of what it 
promises to accomplish in the future. 
Although this type of argument may present more of an uphill battle, it 
should not necessarily deter those of us who are receptive to the Kantian 
conviction that we not only have a duty to support existing states, we are 
obligated to construct states where they are absent.48  Let  me put this  
point in terms of human rights: If we accept the duty to create a first line
of defense against human rights violations where no defense exists, why 
be suspicious of the claim that we also have a duty to create a second 
line of defense when the existing first line of defense is functioning so 
poorly?  What is more, the idea that one’s current imposition might be 
justified by future gains is taken for granted in garden-variety domestic
situations—as when I permissibly take your boat without your permission
in order to try to save a drowning person—so we should not antecedently
rule out this type of claim in defense of a political institution’s authority. 
But even if we should not summarily reject this type of argument, the 
human rights regime obviously must do more than merely claim that it 
will perform various essential functions in the future; it must at least
offer credible evidence that it will in fact do so. By way of analogy, the
Kantian requirement to help create a legitimate state does not imply that 
we must support all in the state of nature who allege that they will soon 
set up a just state; more minimally, it requires one to support only those 
parties who are sufficiently likely to solve the problems in the state of
nature. With this in mind, it is important to recall that I raised concerns 
about both the core documents and the execution of the existing human 
48. See, e.g., Fernando R. Tesón, The Kantian Theory of International Law, 92 
COLUM. L. REV. 53, 65–66 (1992) (suggesting that Kant believed individuals had positive
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rights regime. For instance, my objection to the scant attention paid to the 
standard threat posed by lack of potable water is relevant here because it
casts doubt upon any claim that the only reason the regime is not presently
doing a better job of satisfactorily reducing the worst types of avoidable 
suffering is because more powerful actors are currently standing in the
way of the regime’s carrying out its mission. If the language of this 
regime’s core documents exhibits a pronounced Eurocentric bias, then 
we should not be too quick to accept just any claim that Africans—among 
others—would immediately receive the attention they so desperately need if
only the regime were not boxed in by the current geopolitical structure. 
Second, even if one does not share my worries about the language of
the defining documents of the human rights regime, there are practical 
reasons to question any assurances that the human rights regime will be 
able to buck the trend within international law of ignoring and exploiting 
the worst off.  Problems emerge because the human rights regime’s growth
will inevitably be incremental if it expands.  This observation is significant 
because, given that this growth will occur in the present context, we should 
expect the regime to be disproportionately shaped by and for the most 
powerful countries. For example, the Rome Statute that gave birth to the 
ICC was dramatically “watered down” in the hopes that this more anemic
version might garner the support of the United States, which ultimately
declined to come on board even after its representative had successfully 
lobbied for various concessions.49  More generally, there is more than a
kernel of truth in the charge that the most powerful states are able to 
exploit their relative strength to ensure that international law is written
by and for themselves.50  And if so, we should worry that any human
rights regime that comes of age in the current geopolitical context will
be perverted. 
For the sake of argument, let us assume that I am right to worry that
even if we lend a great deal more support to the human rights regime, 
this regime will likely remain objectionably biased.  Does it follow that
we should not support it?  Not necessarily.  It might be that the existing 
regime is entitled to our support even if it cannot assure us that it will be 
properly attentive to the needs of the world’s most vulnerable people
simply because it provides the best chance for making progress on this
vitally important front.  It may seem counterintuitive to suggest that the
49. See Kielsgard, supra note 23, at 14. 















    
   
 
 




   
 
 
    
  
   
imperative of reducing avoidable suffering requires us to support a 
regime that can claim neither that it presently does a satisfactory job at 
this task nor that it will necessarily do so in the foreseeable future.  But
here we might recall Thomas Nagel’s claim that
in thinking about the future, we should keep in mind that political power is
rarely created as a result of demands for legitimacy, and that there is little 
reason to think that things will be different in this case.
If we look at the historical development of conceptions of justice and
legitimacy for the nation-state, it appears that sovereignty usually precedes 
legitimacy.  First there is the concentration of power; then, gradually, there 
grows a demand for consideration of the interests of the governed, and for
giving them a greater voice in the exercise of power.  The demand may be
reformist, or it may be revolutionary, or it may be a demand for reform made 
credible by the threat of revolution, but it is the existence of concentrated
sovereign power that prompts the demand, and makes legitimacy an issue.51 
With Nagel’s point in mind, think again of Kant’s suggestion that
people in the state of nature have a duty to create a state.52  If this duty
exists, it presumably cannot require only that we support all institutions 
that satisfactorily perform the requisite political functions because, by 
definition, there are no such institutions in the state of nature.  If there is 
any truth to Kant’s insight, then presumably, people in the state of nature
must put their shoulders to the collective political wheel at some point 
substantially prior to when the dominant institution becomes a perfectly
legitimate state.  On the other hand, it cannot be the case that a ruthless 
dictator has the moral standing to demand compliance from those
under the dictator’s control merely because history indicates that the
best chance of getting a legitimate state is for this tyranny to eventually
be transformed into a much more benign creature. After all, supporting
a tyrant seems to be straightforwardly prohibited for the same reasons
we should not serve as an accomplice to any crime.  But if there are no
authoritative regimes in the state of nature and one is prohibited from 
complying with any regime that is not yet legitimate, then what does the 
duty to create a legitimate state amount to in the real world?  What does 
morality demand of those currently living in a failed state such as 
Somalia or an illegitimate state such as ancient Athens, for instance? 
Here is a suggestion: If one lives in a stateless environment or within 
the territorial confines of an illegitimate state, then one has an obligation 
51. Thomas Nagel, The Problem of Global Justice, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 113, 145 
(2005).
52. See, e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, Poverty and Property in Kant’s System of Rights, 
78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 795, 809 (2003) (discussing the Kantian principle that people in 
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to do one’s fair share to help construct a state where none exists or to 
reform the illegitimate government where a state is present.  If this is 
right, then rather than merely follow the commands of an existing tyrant, 
one should do one’s fair share to try to reform this ruler’s practices.  So
if one lives in a lawless environment in which a number of parties are
vying for supremacy, one should do one’s fair share to support whichever 
party is most likely to govern in a just fashion.  And if one of the competing 
protostates seems far more likely to ultimately secure a de facto monopoly 
on the use of force in the territory, then one should work to ensure that it 
will ultimately govern as justly as possible.  What about the enfranchised
Athenians, though; what should they do?  Rather than merely comply 
with the commands of this illegitimate regime, it seems to me that a
privileged Athenian should work for reform.  There is only so much we 
can ask of an individual, of course, so we certainly should not conceive 
of this as a duty to successfully reform that state as a whole, but it does
not seem too demanding to allege only that all privileged citizens in 
Athens have a duty to do their fair share to work for reform.
Assuming that this is correct, what does all of this suggest for the case
of the current human rights regime?  First of all, whatever the defects of
the existing human rights regime—to whatever extent it is reminiscent of 
Athenian democracy—on the spectrum that runs from an emerging 
warlord in Somalia to a paradigmatically legitimate state such as Norway, 
the current human rights regime clearly lies much closer to the latter. 
Even so, both because it is unclear how much of the status quo is the 
result of the human rights regime—as opposed to entrenched features of 
the geopolitical landscape that are thus far beyond the regime’s control— 
and because it is not obvious precisely how well a political institution 
must perform its task in order to be authoritative, it seems to me that
reasonable people can disagree as to whether or not the current human
rights regime enjoys political authority.  If it does have authority, then
states and other actors on the global stage must comply with it.  Even so,
everyone—especially those integral to the regime—has a duty to work 
for its reform so that it comes to look less and less like ancient Athens.
If the existing human rights regime lacks authority, however, then those 
internal to the practice—among others—obviously have a duty to seek
reform.  But notice, even if legitimate states have no duty to comply with
the regime, they still have a duty to help reform the WTO, the United
Nations—especially the Security Council—and such, because even if we 











   
 
 
   
 










      
  
function if it were not obstructed by more powerful forces, it is hard to 
deny that the world would be a better place if organizations such as the
WTO were subordinate to the human rights regime, rather than the other
way around.
At this point, a critic might object to my analogizing the duties of 
privileged citizens in ancient Athens to the obligations of legitimate 
states in the contemporary geopolitical context.  In particular, one might 
protest that Athenian citizens are plausibly obligated to do their fair share of
the political chore only because they have benefitted enormously from 
the state.  Because legitimate states do not stand to benefit to such an extent 
from an international legal human rights regime whose principal focus 
would be to provide a secure second line of defense for the denizens of 
failed and rogue states, however, the principle of fair play does not require
these wealthy states to contribute to a global regime in the same way that 
it binds the privileged citizens of a state to contribute to the maintenance 
of their own government. 
I concede that the principle of fair play may not explain why legitimate 
states are morally required to contribute to the construction and reform 
of a more effective international legal human rights regime, but this does 
not worry me because I am not inclined to invoke the principle of fairness in
the domestic realm either.  In my view, the best way to account for a
citizen’s obligation to obey the law is as a samaritan chore.  In other 
words, rather than say that a citizen of a legitimate state incurs political
obligations of fairness only because the citizen has benefitted from the 
state, I believe each of us has a duty to obey the law as a fair share of the 
larger communal chore of rescuing everyone from the perils of the state 
of nature.53 And given that I believe we have samaritan duties to
help others when they are sufficiently imperiled and we can rescue them
at no unreasonable cost to ourselves, this explains my attraction to the
Kantian notion that, in addition to our duties to comply with existing
regimes, which may or may not benefit us, we may be obligated to help
create a new state when none exists.54  Thus, I believe that the duties of the
residents of contemporary Somalia to create an effective government, the
obligations of the privileged citizens in ancient Athens to reform their 
illegitimate government, and the duties of contemporary Norwegians to 
obey the laws of their legitimate state all spring from the same samaritan
source. And because samaritanism does not require that the rescuer
benefit in order for the duty to be triggered, we need not worry about the 
53. I develop and defend this samaritan account of political obligation at greatest
length in CHRISTOPHER HEATH WELLMAN & A. JOHN SIMMONS, IS THERE A DUTY TO OBEY
THE LAW? (2005). 
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fact—if it is a fact—that legitimate states do not stand to gain enough to 
compensate for their contribution to a more effective international legal 
human rights regime.  Let me emphasize: although we are obligated to 
create, reform, and maintain political institutions precisely because they
are capable of supplying precious benefits that would not be available in
their absence, we should not conceive of these institutions as merely
mutually beneficial arrangements that bind participants only if—and to 
the extent that—each profits from these institutions. 
If my arguments to this point have been sound, then just as privileged
citizens in Athens had a moral duty to work to reform their illegitimate 
state, the world’s most powerful states should presumably strive to reform
the existing human rights regime.  But what about individual citizens?
Does the average Norwegian, New Zealander, or Canadian, for instance,
have a duty to try to improve the international status quo, or are our 
political obligations owed at only the national—and perhaps more 
local—levels?  Given that international law is principally made by 
and for states, individuals are in an important sense removed from the
international legal human rights regime.55  Does this mean that individuals 
need not work for its reform?  Absolutely not.  Other things being equal, 
individuals may be primarily responsible for reforming their domestic 
governments, but one can acknowledge that we should attend first and 
foremost to our local institutions and still not commit oneself to the
unwarranted conclusion that the international order should be left 
exclusively to states and their representatives. 
To appreciate the plausibility of the idea that individuals may permissibly 
attend first to local institutions, consider privileged white citizens in 
apartheid South Africa.  If we stipulate that South Africa, during this era, 
unjustifiably privileged citizens of European ancestry over those of 
African ancestry to the same extent that the larger international order 
privileged Europeans over Africans, then I would have no qualms with 
people who focused all of their energies on the domestic inequalities.
After all, these privileged South Africans strike me as more directly
implicated in the domestic injustice than in global inequities, and so I 
55. See, e.g., Filip Spagnoli, The Globalization of Human Rights Law: Why Do
Human Rights Need International Law?, 14 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 317, 320 (2008) 
(“Traditionally, individuals play no part in international law.  From its humble beginnings, 




























would not object to their focusing on these more local problems.56  I am
not inclined to give a similar free pass to the citizens of contemporary 
Norway, New Zealand, and Canada, however.  I appreciate that there is 
more work to be done in each of these countries.  But one can acknowledge
both that (1) there is injustice in each of these states and (2) other things
being equal, citizens are primarily responsible for reforming their domestic
governments, without allowing Norwegians, New Zealanders, and
Canadians to ignore global matters, because their domestic issues and 
the international issues are clearly not equal.  The crucial point, I think, 
is that human rights beget global responsibilities, and so even if those 
who live in egregiously unjust societies may justifiably take their eye off 
of the global ball, the citizens of wealthy liberal democratic states must
do their fair share to reform the international legal status quo.  At the 
very least, these citizens should pressure their elected leaders and business
executives to prioritize reform.  To put this last point in terms of the title 
of this Article, I would say that if the current international legal human
rights regime does enjoy political authority, then citizens of powerful
states are obligated to lobby their leaders to comply with this regime’s
commands, and if the existing regime currently lacks authority, then 
citizens should work directly for reform of this regime and exhort their 
representatives to work for its reform. 
V. CONCLUSION
A salient lesson of our discussion is the importance of distinguishing 
between the related but distinct questions of “Should we support the 
human rights movement?” and “Must we comply with the existing 
international legal human rights regime?”.  Even if reasonable people can 
disagree about how to answer the latter question, I am convinced that the 
former question can be easily and emphatically answered in the affirmative.
In the end, then, although we may be unable to determine conclusively
whether the existing regime functions well enough to enjoy political 
authority, this should lead to uncertainty regarding only the content, not
the existence, of our duty to work toward a world in which there are far 
fewer human rights violations.  It seems to me that those of us in wealthy 
liberal democratic states all have stringent and demanding duties to ensure
that many more people are institutionally protected against the worst
forms of avoidable suffering.  One obvious way to do this would be to work
56. Thomas Pogge’s analysis allows him to offer a straightforward explanation for
this conviction. See  POGGE, supra note 35, at 235. By citing contribution, he could
stress that members of an unjust state coproduce the harms that the state inflicts and so
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for a stronger international legal human rights regime that is more attentive 
to the pressing needs of the world’s most vulnerable people.  The only
question is whether this duty must be paid in the currency of compliance
with the commands of the existing international legal human rights 
regime.
In order to motivate this question, I have compared the current human
rights regime to Athenian democracy.  Even if this analogy is ultimately
inapt, it might nevertheless be instructive.  To see why, consider what 
we can learn from another provocative but inapt analogy: the idea that
contemporary academia is a caste system.  It is not an uncommon notion 
that the various academic ranks of graduate student, adjunct instructor, 
lecturer, untenured professor, tenured professor, and such are morally
tantamount to different castes.  But both because people voluntarily
assume these roles and because it is common to progress through these 
academic stations, this analogy is clearly inapt.  Still, the mere fact that
there is an initial plausibility to this comparison should give us pause. 
At the very least, we should carefully consider whether there are compelling 
reasons for structuring academia in its current form and whether there
are ways we can make its various ranks appear less caste-like without
sacrificing anything important. 
I hope that comparing the human rights regime to ancient Athens is 
similarly illuminating.  Because the analogy is inapt, it does not 
straightforwardly justify the conclusion that the existing regime lacks
political authority.  Like the comparison between academia and the caste 
system, though, this analogy can still be illustrative.  In particular, reflecting
upon Athenian democracy reminds us that although there is a tendency
to be impressed by the remarkable things political institutions might
enable us to achieve, states and other institutions that claim political
authority must be judged primarily upon the avoidable depths they
enable humans to avoid rather than the spectacular heights they allow a
select few to scale. Above all, we want states as a first line of defense 
against the standard threats to living minimally decent lives.  And given 
how regularly states lose their balance, we do not want them operating 
without a net.  In view of the grave importance of providing a second
line of defense, the international legal human rights regime would have a 
compelling claim to political authority over sovereign states if it 
satisfactorily performed this vital function.  I am confident that the regime is
not currently doing enough on behalf of the world’s most vulnerable
people, but it remains unclear to me how much of the status quo can
953
 
 fairly be blamed on the existing human rights regime.  What I hope this
Article sheds light on, though, is the type of reforms this regime must 
pursue if it is to stake an unqualified claim to a larger, more authoritative 
role in global politics. 
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